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This article analyzes the impact of the residential security maps created by the Home Owners’Loan
Corporation (HOLC) during the 1930s on residential mortgages in Philadelphia. Researchers have
consistently argued that HOLC caused redlining and disinvestment in U.S. cities by sharing its color-coded
maps. Geographic information systems and spatial statistical models were used to analyze address-level
mortgage data from Philadelphia to determine if areas with worse grades actually had less access to residential
mortgage credit as a result. Findings indicate that the grades on HOLC’s map do not explain differences in
lending patterns with the exception of interest rates, which were higher in areas colored red. Archival material
and journal articles from the 1930s also reveal that lenders were avoiding areas colored red before HOLC
made its maps, that HOLC’s maps were not widely distributed, and that lenders had other sources of
information about real estate risk levels.
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This article analyzes the impact of the residential security maps created by the Home Owners’Loan Corpo-
ration (HOLC) during the 1930s on residential mortgages in Philadelphia. Researchers have consistently ar-
gued that HOLC caused redlining and disinvestment in U.S. cities by sharing its color-coded maps. Geo-
graphic information systems and spatial statistical models were used to analyze address-level mortgage data
from Philadelphia to determine if areas with worse grades actually had less access to residential mortgage
credit as a result. Findings indicate that the grades on HOLC’s map do not explain differences in lending pat-
terns with the exception of interest rates, which were higher in areas colored red. Archival material and jour-
nal articles from the 1930s also reveal that lenders were avoiding areas colored red before HOLC made its
maps, that HOLC’s maps were not widely distributed, and that lenders had other sources of information
about real estate risk levels.
Keywords: redlining; discrimination; Home Owners’Loan Corporation; Federal Housing Administration;
Philadelphia
The federal government created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
(HOLC) during the Depression to slow down the dramatic increase in the rate
of housing foreclosures.1 Between 1933 and 1936, HOLC made new low-
interest, self-amortizing mortgages to one million homeowners who were in
default or had already lost their homes. As HOLC was nearing completion of
its original lending in 1935, HOLC’s parent organization, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), established a program that used HOLC staff and
local realtors and lenders to appraise real estate risk levels in 239 cities.2 This
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City Survey Program produced detailed reports for each city along with a
series of now infamous security maps that assigned residential areas a grade
from one to four. Areas with African Americans, as well as those with older
housing and poorer households, were consistently given a fourth grade, or
“hazardous,” rating and colored red.
Kenneth Jackson discovered HOLC’s maps while conducting research for
Crabgrass Frontier and connected the areas colored red to those that were later
redlined. Redlining refers to lending (or insurance) discrimination that bases
credit decisions on the location of a property to the exclusion of characteristics
of the borrower or property. Usually, it means that lenders will not make loans
to areas with African Americans or other perceived risks to real estate invest-
ments. Jackson argued that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
private lenders obtained copies of the HOLC maps and that the grades on the
maps impacted their lending decisions.3 Subsequent research on HOLC has
consistently cited Jackson’s work about the effect of these maps on lending and
urban disinvestment. But none of it has provided specific evidence that the
maps actually impacted residential mortgage patterns or that FHA and private
lenders were not using other maps and sources of data to determine where to
make loans. Using archival research, geographic information systems, and
spatial statistical modeling based on data from Philadelphia, this article pro-
vides evidence that challenges the HOLC redlining thesis and offers an alter-
native explanation for how redlining happened.
BACKGROUND
Community groups in Chicago’s Austin neighborhood coined the word red-
lining in the late 1960s, referring literally to red lines lenders and insurance
providers admitted drawing around areas they would not service.4 Both the
National Commission on Urban Problems and the President’s National Advi-
sory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas found evidence of such literal
mortgage and insurance redlining.5 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 does not
specifically mention redlining, but it does prohibit discrimination at any stage
of the lending or home insurance process, and subsequent court decisions have
held that it does prohibit redlining.6 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974,
the Home Mortgage Discrimination Act of 1975, and the Community Rein-
vestment Act of 1977 have all created additional protections against redlining.
But in the 1930s and 1940s, there were virtually no legal obstacles to lending
discrimination. Redlining—not yet given a name—was simply considered to
be good business.7
Kenneth Jackson’s 1980 article in the Journal of Urban History was the first
published research to connect HOLC’s color-coded maps with the practice of
redlining.8 He included the article as a chapter in his seminal 1985 book,
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Crabgrass Frontier, using the maps to support his larger thesis that the policies
of the federal government accelerated suburbanization at the expense of urban
neighborhoods. The neighborhood appraisal activities of the overlooked
HOLC fit a larger pattern of promoting the suburbs and devaluing urban
neighborhoods.
As provocative as it was, Jackson’s connection between the maps and later
redlining was as much a suggestion as an argument. A conservative reading of
Crabgrass Frontier supports the notion that HOLC institutionalized, rather
than initiated, redlining. Jackson implied that HOLC was largely reactive,
influenced by the leading ecological theorists of the day such as Homer Hoyt
as well as professionals in the field.9 There was a “free interchange” among
HOLC, FHA, and private realtors, he explained, noting that local lenders and
realtors served as map consultants for the City Survey Program.10 In effect,
then, HOLC’s maps constituted federal endorsement of standards that were
already in practice.
A more liberal reading of Crabgrass Frontier leads to the unqualified con-
clusion that HOLC initiated redlining. The closest Jackson came to saying this
was at the beginning of the chapter, offering a contrast to the glowing assess-
ment of HOLC’s impact that C. Lowell Harriss provided in his 1951 History
and Policies of the Home Owners’Loan Corporation. “A less favorable judge-
ment,” Jackson wrote, “would be that the Home Owners Loan Corporation ini-
tiated the practice of ‘red-lining’ ” (p. 197). While many researchers who have
cited Jackson have noted the influence of map consultants and others on
HOLC, few have hesitated to declare that HOLC caused redlining. Based more
on Jackson’s authority than the evidence he provided, subsequent research on
HOLC has taken for granted HOLC’s redlining and ultimate impact on urban
residential patterns. Instead of testing the redlining thesis, then, research on
HOLC has served to magnify the effect of Jackson’s original work by extend-
ing his conclusions to numerous cities and introducing countless researchers
of urban history to the redlining practices of the HOLC.11
Coloring areas red based on their housing and demographic characteristics
may have reflected racial prejudice on the part of HOLC, but it does not consti-
tute redlining unless lenders actually used the maps to decide where to make
loans and what types of loans to make. Existing research on HOLC has leapt
over the evidence of redlining, basing its harsh assessments of HOLC on loose
correlations between areas colored red on the residential security maps and
those that experienced rapid decline in later decades. This approach has con-
tributed almost no information about how local and federal institutions devel-
oped standards and shared appraisal information or how lenders actually made
decisions about mortgages. In other words, it has given us little insight into
how redlining occurred, particularly whether redlining involved different
practices and different consideration in different places.
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HOLC AND REDLINING
A variety of evidence suggests that HOLC was not responsible for redlin-
ing. First, analysis of the location of HOLC’s own loans in several different cit-
ies demonstrates that the agency did not practice redlining itself. Sources from
the 1930s and 1940s, including the appraisal sheets for individual neighbor-
hoods filled out by HOLC field agents, also indicate that lenders were avoiding
areas they perceived to be high risk even before HOLC created its maps. A
review of the process through which the maps were created and maintained
indicates that relatively few lenders probably had access to HOLC’s maps,
limited most likely to those who served as map consultants to HOLC. The
research conducted and maps created by organizations other than HOLC,
including FHA and private lenders, further indicate that HOLC’s maps were
not the only, or even the best, source of information about real estate risk levels.
Finally, analysis of mortgage lending in Philadelphia for the decade after
HOLC made its maps shows that lenders did not categorically refuse to make
loans to areas colored red by HOLC or provide loans with considerably differ-
ent terms. Together, these findings cast doubt on the argument that HOLC
caused redlining, instead lending support to alternative explanations of how
redlining happened and providing direction for future research.
HOLC’S OWN LENDING
HOLC did not practice redlining through its own lending program. Nothing
in HOLC’s policies put areas with older homes or racial and ethnic minorities
at a disadvantage. HOLC staff did not have access to the residential security
maps because the maps were made after HOLC made most of its loans, but
HOLC did make loans in all areas, particularly those later colored red and yel-
low. Previous research about HOLC’s lending has drawn from loan summaries
that the agency created after making loans. These summaries, apparently cre-
ated only for cities that HOLC resurveyed, reported the number of loans in
each of the four different graded areas. Jackson reported that 60 percent of
HOLC loans made between 1935 and 1936 in Essex County, New Jersey
(Newark), and 68 percent of loans in Shelby County, Tennessee (Memphis),
were made to third- and fourth-grade areas.12 Lizabeth Cohen and John
Metzger have reported that HOLC made 60 percent of its loans in Chicago to
properties in C or D neighborhoods. Metzger further determined that 95 per-
cent of the 2,156 HOLC loans made in the vicinity of Chicago’s downtown
Loop were made on properties in neighborhoods given fourth-grade ratings.13
An analysis of HOLC loans in Philadelphia, a city not resurveyed by HOLC,
using local mortgage records found that HOLC made more than 60 percent of
its loans to areas colored red and another 20 percent to areas colored yellow.14
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HOLC did apparently reinforce racial segregation in some situations. When
the agency acquired properties through foreclosure because homeowners were
unable to make their payments to HOLC, they allowed the local brokers who
were responsible for selling off those properties to follow local segregation
standards.15 But this constituted racial steering, not redlining, because it dis-
criminated against individuals rather than areas. An argument that HOLC
caused redlining, then, must focus on the impact HOLC’s maps had on other
lenders.
REDLINING BEFORE HOLC
The practice of not making loans to areas considered high risk predated
HOLC’s maps, something that HOLC’s own fieldwork confirmed. The forms
field agents used to complete the area descriptions that accompanied the maps
asked about the availability of mortgage funds. In explaining the basis for each
of the four grades, FHLBB materials said that mortgage lenders were already
more conservative in areas HOLC assigned as third grade (“C”) and offered
mortgages with lower loan-to-value ratios. Lenders often refused to lend in
neighborhoods HOLC subsequently considered fourth grade (“D”), while
“others will lend only on a conservative basis.”16 In Philadelphia, field agents
noted that mortgage funds were available in some of the third- and fourth-
grade areas on a very limited basis, while in others—such as the western half of
South Philadelphia, large sections of Southwest Philadelphia, and part of
North Philadelphia—none were available.17 Regardless of whether they were
actually using maps to identify high-risk areas, lenders across the country were
already choosing not to make loans in certain areas by the time HOLC con-
ducted its surveys.
HOLC field agents were not the only ones to identify early redlining prac-
tices. In the wake of the 1919 race riot, the Chicago Commission on Race Rela-
tions determined that African Americans faced significant barriers in securing
mortgages, with some lenders completely avoiding areas where African
Americans lived.18 The Mortgage Conference of New York was also involved
in redlining, sharing block-level maps as early as 1932 and encouraging mem-
ber banks to avoid areas with concentrations of African Americans.19 These
two examples are probably rare only in that they were documented. Refusing
to lend to certain areas, particularly those with African Americans, was such
common practice that apparently few people found it remarkable during the
1920s and 1930s.
ACCESS TO HOLC’S MAPS
For HOLC to have caused redlining, FHA and private lenders had to have
had access to the maps. Otherwise, even if mortgage-lending patterns in red
areas were different, the maps could not have been the cause. Some private
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lenders and the FHA definitely did have access to the HOLC maps, but evi-
dence indicates that access was not nearly as widespread as prior historical
narratives have assumed. The confidential nature of the survey and efforts
taken by the FHLBB to keep track of all copies of the maps, the difficulty that
would have been involved in making additional (unauthorized) copies, the
sheer number of institutions making loans then, and the lack of references to
the maps in journals and books all suggest that most lenders did not have
access to the maps.
The FHLBB considered all of the materials assembled through the exten-
sive City Survey Program to be confidential, taking measures to safeguard
them and prevent the materials from being used for purposes other than their
own. The City Survey Program was intended to support FHLBB’s collection
on the million mortgages HOLC extended to distressed homeowners as well
as to help the board support the savings and loan industry.20 The board was
also concerned about protecting the identity of the local realtors and consul-
tants who provided information with the assurance that only the FHLBB
would use it.
The board received requests for copies of the reports created through the
City Survey Program and, starting in 1938, decided to distribute copies of sum-
maries for each city after deleting material judged to be confidential.21 The
maps, too, were in demand. “Almost from the beginning of the Survey Pro-
gram there was a constant demand for copies from that part of the public which
was familiar with the theme of them,” according to a FHLBB memo summa-
rizing the City Survey Program. After receiving many written requests for cop-
ies of the maps, the board decided to limit distribution to agencies within the
FHLBB and “such government agencies having interests allied with those of
the Board.” The FHLBB feared that the “maps would be misused or interpreta-
tions placed upon the grades indicated therein which were not intended.”22
Only fifty to sixty copies of each map were made, most of which were dis-
tributed to FHLBB and HOLC staff members in the national and regional
offices. FHLBB also provided copies to a handful of government agencies
including the FHA, the U.S. Housing Authority, the California Veterans Wel-
fare Board, the Federal Public Housing Authority, National Housing Adminis-
trator’s office, the Commissioner of Banks for Wisconsin (Milwaukee map
only), “and one or two others.”23 The board invited other “outside” government
agencies with an interest in the maps to review them at the Washington, D.C.,
office of the Division of Research and Statistics. Fearing that even government
agencies could misinterpret and misuse the maps, the board suggested that the
Division of Research and Statistics “should make certain that those who expect
to use the maps understand the objective, purposes, and uses of them. Other-
wise, wrong conclusions may be drawn and thus more harm has been done
than good.”24
No copies were given to “private interests,” and even regional managers for
HOLC were required to eventually return the maps to the Division of Research
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and Statistics. The board also expected HOLC regional managers to be “rea-
sonably diligent in safeguarding the confidential nature of the material to the
end that the maps, in particular, do not fall into private hands.”25 Given the
repeated statements in the explanation of the security grades that good loans
could be made in red and yellow areas, the board probably feared that misun-
derstanding of the maps would cause further disinvestment in poorly rated
areas. The maps were difficult and expensive to reproduce, a fact that dis-
suaded the board from providing additional copies for a fee. The color maps
were large, often 36″ × 48″, and would not have been copied easily by anyone
trying to circumvent the formal reproduction process. So while it is possible
that those within the federal government, including HOLC and FHA staff, who
received copies of the HOLC maps could have shared their copies with people
outside their agencies, this would clearly have been in violation of FHLBB
policy.
By the time the FHLBB resurveyed some twenty-three cities in 1939, staff
members were in the habit of sending a copy of the written summary to all of
the local realtors and lenders who provided material. These summaries pro-
vided overviews of real estate conditions in each city, indicating what FHLBB
was concerned about, but they did not provide detailed descriptions of HOLC
ratings for individual neighborhoods. The City Survey Program archival files
for several cities, such as Atlantic City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, include
mailing lists of about fifty individuals who were sent copies. There are no such
distribution lists for the maps. One letter addressed to City Survey Program
Director Clifford Boyd from the business manager of the Chicago Real Estate
Board acknowledging receipt of the Chicago summary did mention the maps.
“Incidentally,” he wrote in parentheses, “I hope to be able to ‘borrow’ a map
from your portfolio when you are not looking during your journey in Chicago.”
Even if he did succeed in getting a copy of Chicago’s security map, his com-
ment indicates that he knew FHLBB’s policy was to not share the maps.26
Jackson based his conclusion that private lenders had access to the security
maps on interviews the FHLBB conducted with banks and savings and loan
associations in Essex County (Newark), New Jersey, during the late 1930s.
Many of the lenders reported that they considered “A and B” or “blue” areas as
the most desirable, while they would not make loans to “red and most yellow”
or “C and D” neighborhoods. Jackson understood these responses to be written
by the lenders, referring directly to HOLC’s maps and grading system. “Obvi-
ously, private banking institutions were privy to and influenced by the govern-
ment’s Residential Security Maps.”27 These interviews were completed as part
of the resurvey of northern New Jersey in 1939 through the City Survey Pro-
gram. It was field agents, not the lenders themselves, who wrote up the answers
from the survey, so it is possible that the grades and colors were the field
agents’shorthand rather than the literal answers provided by the lenders.28 It is
much more likely that lenders would have described areas using town and
neighborhood names (which were mentioned in the responses along with
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grades and colors) rather than “D-3” or “C-16,” for example. These interviews
do not, then, constitute unequivocal proof that lenders had access to HOLC’s
maps or that lenders avoided areas because of their HOLC ratings.
The sheer number of institutions involved in residential mortgage lending in
the years immediately after HOLC created the maps casts further doubt on the
idea that they all had access to the maps. In Philadelphia, several hundred dif-
ferent lenders provided mortgages in the ten-year period following the cre-
ation of the maps. Only a handful of the city’s realtors and lenders served as
map consultants to HOLC and definitely knew that the maps were being made,
even if they never saw the final version. If the FHLBB authorized the creation
of sixty copies of Philadelphia’s security map and restricted access to them, it
is unlikely that more than a fraction of the local lenders ever saw it. For smaller
cities, the proportion of local lenders involved in the HOLC appraisal process
would have been greater, but still the majority of lenders were most likely not
involved.
Finally, the fact that there were almost no references to HOLC’s maps in
books and journals before Jackson published his research suggests that the
FHLBB largely succeeded in keeping the maps a secret.29 The real estate and
appraisal industries were eager to share new techniques for rating neighbor-
hoods during this time period, and their journals contained numerous articles
about neighborhood risk ratings through the1930s and 1940s. Had there been
widespread knowledge of FHLBB’s maps, the articles probably would have
discussed them more frequently. Secondary sources describing HOLC made
absolutely no mention of the maps before Crabgrass Frontier. Harriss’s 1951
History and Policies of the Home Owners’Loan Corporation never mentioned
the maps or even the City Survey Program. Harriss had access to HOLC
records and staff members, so it is hard to believe that he had no knowledge of
them. But even if he chose (or was asked) to leave this part of HOLC’s history
out of his book, this decision indicates that the mapping enterprise was basi-
cally kept secret.
Most surprising is that frequent HOLC critic Charles Abrams never saw the
maps. Abrams mentioned HOLC in several of his books, complaining that
HOLC directed its assistance more toward bailing out lenders than aiding
homeowners and that HOLC’s lending policies reinforced racial segregation.
In Forbidden Neighbors (1955), he did cite an article describing HOLC’s
neighborhood rating system. Abrams took HOLC’s work as proof that the
agency, like FHA, undervalued areas with African Americans and supported
racial segregation. But had he actually seen the maps and understood the scope
of the City Survey Program, it is likely that he would have offered much more
extensive, and harsh, commentary.30
Who, then, had access to the maps? Clearly, FHA staff did since FHLBB
made copies specifically for the agency. The dozen or so realtors and lenders
who served as map consultants in each city no doubt knew of the maps and saw
some version of them. But the evidence indicates that the maps were neither
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distributed nor available to a wide audience. The access both FHA and private
lenders had to other information about neighborhood risk, including maps,
also suggests that the maps were not as precious or unique as previous HOLC
research has implied.
OTHER SOURCES ON NEIGHBORHOOD RISK
If FHA and private lenders had access to information about neighborhood
risk other than HOLC’s maps, then there are other possible explanations for
any redlining that occurred. Evidence suggests that they did have other sources
along with the technical skills to conduct their own surveys and create their
own maps. FHA carried out several different research studies that generated
maps and reports. In addition, FHA developed a detailed risk rating system of
its own, even before the FHLBB started its City Survey Program, that most
likely had a much larger influence on private lenders than the FHLBB’s did.
Lenders also conducted their own research, and the widespread use of maps
within and outside the real estate and banking industries further supports the
notion that private lenders did not need HOLC’s maps to determine where they
should and should not make loans.
The FHA was the most important source of information about neighbor-
hood risk during the 1930s and 1940s. The National Housing Act, passed in
June 1934 before the FHLBB initiated its City Survey Program, required that
FHA’s research director make “such statistical surveys and legal and economic
studies as he shall deem useful to guide the development of housing and the
creation of a sound mortgage market.”31 The Division of Economics and Statis-
tics was responsible for most of this work and conducted several different stud-
ies and collected existing data from a variety of sources. FHA frequently cited
this legal mandate when introducing the division’s research findings.32
FHA had an extensive map collection, consisting largely of maps the Divi-
sion of Economics and Statistics created based on data from the 1934 and 1939
Works Progress Administration’s Real Property Surveys.33 FHA expected that
its block-level maps, in particular, could help an appraiser “refresh his memory
as to the danger points in the neighborhood.”34 In addition to gathering existing
sources of information, FHA conducted its own surveys under the supervision
of Principal Housing Economist Homer Hoyt. Hoyt issued detailed guidelines
in “The Preparation of Maps Showing the Dynamic Factors of City Growth” in
January 1935. “The maps, if prepared carefully according to the suggestions
now to be given, should lay the groundwork for the rating of neighborhoods,”
he explained. Hoyt instructed staff responsible for creating the maps to draw
lines in specific colors around certain types of areas. In the first set of maps, red
was to be used to mark off areas with concentrations of an “undesirable ele-
ment” such as distinct racial, national, or income groups.35 These maps were
part of FHA’s larger Program for the Study of Sixty-two Cities that formed the
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basis for The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American
Cities authored by Hoyt and published by FHA in 1939.
The FHA also conducted a series of Housing Market Analyses, large data
collection and map-making efforts undertaken between 1937 and 1942. This
project was intended to generate maps that would indicate areas where it was
“safe” for FHA to insure mortgages. John Metzger included a copy of a FHA
mortgage risk map for Chicago from 1938 in his dissertation that may have
been the product of one of these Housing Market Analyses. The map used let-
ters and colors, with “D” and red indicating areas with the highest risk, to cate-
gorize districts in Chicago.36
More important than having conducted studies and created maps, FHA pro-
vided detailed instructions for appraising neighborhood risk through its
Underwriting Manual. Unlike FHLBB’s City Survey Program materials and
some of the reports FHA generated, the underwriting manuals were intended
for use outside the agency and were widely publicized and distributed.37 FHA’s
original (1935) risk-rating system used the same letter grades as HOLC’s,
reserving the “D” category for properties with the lowest rating that were
rejected for insurance.38 As with the HOLC field agents, a neighborhood’s sta-
bility and “protection from adverse influences” and “infiltration of inharmoni-
ous racial or nationality groups” were primary considerations in ranking it.39
FHA’s system focused on appraising individual mortgages rather than whole
areas like HOLC, but the final summary rating determined by the chief under-
writer incorporated information about neighborhood risk along with ratings of
the property and borrower. Lenders interested in securing FHA insurance for
their loans had an incentive to follow FHA’s guidelines because, in addition to
protecting against losses, FHA insurance virtually guaranteed that a loan could
be resold on the secondary mortgage market. The assistant secretary at a build-
ing and loan association in New Jersey acknowledged the pressure to adopt
FHA’s standards in an interview with the FHLBB: “The most desirable lending
areas are considered to be those having the approval of F.H.A., and in all proba-
bility no loans will be made in areas not approved by that agency.”40 Lenders
had no such incentives to adopt HOLC’s ratings beyond the ability of the
grades to actually predict risk.
The fact that FHA had its own maps and ideas about mortgage risk does not
rule out the possibility that FHA was influenced by HOLC’s maps. But it does
show that FHA fulfilled its legal mandate to assess risk by gathering informa-
tion from a number of different sources even before FHLBB’s City Survey
Program was under way in late 1935. There are striking similarities between
the survey methods and questionnaires used by FHA and FHLBB, as well as
their maps and grading system, and it is hard to imagine that the two agencies
were not working together. In fact, the FHLBB minutes show that board mem-
bers approved the request of Ernest Fisher, director of FHA’s Economics and
Statistics Division, that Corwin Fergus, the director of FHLBB’s Division of
Research and Statistics, “be permitted to cooperate with him in the exchange
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of information gathered by their respective divisions.”41 But it is likely that
FHA influenced FHLBB as much or more than FHLBB influenced FHA.
Hoyt’s emphasis on the constantly changing nature of neighborhoods suggests
that HOLC’s static maps would have been inadequate for FHA.
While FHA saw itself as the leader in conducting research and setting stan-
dards, the agency did encourage private lenders to systematically investigate
conditions in cities, as well. “Mortgage lenders and real-estate men can aid in
obtaining those local statistics,” explained James Taylor, associate director of
FHA’s Division of Economics and Statistics, “and if we combine forces in get-
ting them we can all ride to town together.”42 The division supported local
research efforts by sending the data it had to local lenders on request.43
The FHLBB wanted lenders to conduct their own analyses of real estate
trends as well. The Federal Home Loan Bank Review published an article in
1936 describing the need for security maps. In an apparent reference to the
City Survey Program, the article credited FHLBB’s Mortgage Rehabilitation
Division with showing the practical value of such maps: “As a result, several
hundred institutions which had never previously considered such an approach
to their mortgage problem have begun to develop and maintain security maps.”
FHLBB’s Mortgage Rehabilitation Division facilitated this widespread
mapmaking by preparing “simple instructions for the making of security maps
of residential neighborhoods from information available to any experienced
mortgage lender.”44 In introducing a similar article about neighborhood rating,
a writer for the Review of the Society of Residential Appraisers explained that
the FHLBB’s Division of Research and Statistics had developed standards for
determining neighborhood risk. HOLC had adopted these standards in con-
ducting its own study of cities, but “it is also suggested that the procedure
might profitably be adopted by other lending institutions or groups of institu-
tions wishing to analyze the lending area in which they operate.”45
There are many other references, and actual examples, of security maps cre-
ated outside of FHA and FHLBB. In the 1961 edition of their book Real Estate
Finance, Henry Hoagland and Leo Stone noted that savings and loan associa-
tions had accepted the need to study neighborhoods before making loans.
“Sometimes the results of this study are dramatized in the form of a security
map of their market,” perhaps created from a regular street map and using dif-
ferent colors to represent different conditions. “Red spots on the map are dan-
ger signs,” they wrote, while green was used for the most desirable areas, blue
represented good areas “passed their peak of values,” and yellow indicated that
an area was declining.46 Hoagland served on the FHLBB during the time it con-
ducted the City Survey Program, so the similarity between this grading scheme
that he and Stone described and the one used by the FHLBB is not a coinci-
dence. Even if the authors were being coy in not mentioning the FHLBB maps
directly, their discussion of risk-rating systems indicates that a wide group of
institutions had been making security maps of their own.
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Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles outlined its research program
in a 1940 article in the FHA journal Insured Mortgage Portfolio.47 Acknowl-
edging FHA’s pioneering role in bringing attention to the effect of neighbor-
hood conditions on mortgage risk, Smith noted that other lending institutions
like his were also working to develop methods for analyzing neighborhoods.
Neighborhoods have a life cycle through which they are born, grow rapidly,
become mature, begin to decline, and eventually become blighted, he
explained, consistent with the ecological principles that were the basis for
HOLC’s neighborhood appraisals. The use of somewhat different language,
though, suggests that Security-First National Bank did not just adopt HOLC’s
grading system. The article included a map applying this life-cycle concept to
Los Angeles, categorizing each neighborhood’s life cycle as subdivision,
growth, maturity, decline, or decadence (see Figure 1). Clearly, Security-First
National Bank saw itself playing an active role in determining neighborhood
appraisals, not passively adopting HOLC’s (or even FHA’s) methods and
maps.
J. M. Brewer, director of a clearinghouse for real estate information in Phil-
adelphia and a former chief appraiser for the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, completed another ambitious mapping project in 1934, before
HOLC started its City Survey Program the following year. The block-level
data Brewer recorded was based on his own survey rather than the Real Prop-
erty Survey.48 Using different colors and crosshatchings, Brewer indicated the
location and degree of concentration of Jews, Italians, and “Colored people.”
He offered location ratings based on class rather than each neighborhood’s life
cycle, distinguishing highest-class residential, upper-middle-class, middle-
class, lower- or working-class, and decadent areas. He noted which blocks
included businesses and industry and estimated the age and value of housing.
As mentioned earlier, the Mortgage Conference of New York was also making
and sharing maps during this period. These included block-level maps indicat-
ing small and large concentrations of African Americans.49
A survey of appraisal practices reported in a 1941 article in the Review for
the Society of Residential Appraisers confirmed that appraisers and lenders
took advantage of many different sources of information about neighbor-
hoods. Not content with standard forms or those prepared by contracted
appraisers, lenders developed their own forms. “Primarily, lending institutions
indicated that they purchased their statistical information, both that which was
national in scope and that which was local in character, such as real property
inventories and statistical data, from title companies, assessors offices, and the
like,” according to the survey. Some lenders also reported collecting their own
statistical data.50
By the 1930s, maps had also become popular tools for understanding sales
patterns outside of the real estate industry. The emerging city planning profes-
sion used maps extensively in the 1920s and 1930s, taking advantage of the
array of survey data collected during the Depression to identify slums and
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support certain policy interventions.51 The Detroit Free Press’s research
department produced maps that categorized Detroit into “A,” “B,” and “C” dis-
tricts based on newspaper retail sales.52 The Curtis Publishing Company pub-
lished a handbook for salesmen in 1935 to help them distinguish “good” and
“poor” areas.53 These types of maps suggest that the practice of judging neigh-
borhoods based on their economic value extended outside the real estate indus-
try. Maps were ideal ways of presenting this information to a diverse audience,
and an increasing number and type of groups had learned how to make them on
their own.
Clearly, the HOLC maps were not the only source of information available
to FHA and private lenders during the 1930s and 1940s. The detailed housing
and demographic data made available through the U.S. Census and Real Prop-
erty Surveys, in addition to the miscellaneous other maps and data sources
available in different cities, would have allowed them to determine neighbor-
hood risk on their own. With their knowledge of the local real estate based on
the success of their own investments, they were probably in a better position to
interpret real estate data than some of HOLC’s field agents were. Although the
HOLC maps may have projected a certain authority because they were created
by the agents of the federal government, lenders may also have recognized that
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Figure 1: Neighborhood Life-Cycle Map from Security-First National Bank of Los An-
geles, 1940
SOURCE: Insured Mortgage Portfolio 2 (February 1938): 9-11, 23.
NOTE: From darkest to lightest, the five categories indicate decadence, decline, maturity, growth,
and subdivision.
the federal government depended on local experts and other sources of data
that were available to them. To the extent they did look to the federal govern-
ment for data and guidelines for conducting their own research, it is more
likely that they looked to FHA. With easy access to FHA’s advice through the
Underwriting Manual, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighbor-
hoods in American Cities, and articles in real estate, appraisal, and govern-
ment-sponsored journals, they would not have had to look far.
HOLC GRADES AND MORTGAGE-LENDING PATTERNS
Even if redlining had not existed before and if lenders all had access to
HOLC’s maps and no other sources of neighborhood risk, it would still be nec-
essary to show a correlation between the grades and mortgage-lending patterns
to prove that HOLC caused redlining. Using a digitized version of the HOLC
map for Philadelphia, address-level mortgage data from 1938 to 1950 were
analyzed to determine if mortgage patterns varied across HOLC grade (see
Figure 2).54 Five different samples of mortgage transactions were analyzed.
The first represented a random citywide sample of five hundred properties.
The other four samples included all the properties in twenty- to twenty-five-
block areas where three or more different HOLC grades came together. The
citywide sample was intended to maximize the generalizability of the findings,
while the small area samples were intended to maximize internal validity by
only comparing properties within the same part of the city.
Most previous research on HOLC has interpreted redlining as lenders’
refusal, or at least reluctance, to make loans to areas deemed high risk because
of their racial, ethnic, income, and housing characteristics. More current
research, and even legislation aimed at preventing redlining, holds that redlin-
ing also occurs when different (less favorable) terms are offered.55 Rather than
refusing to make a loan, a lender might offer a mortgage with a higher interest
rate, lower loan-to-value ratio, or shorter term. Current studies on mortgage
lending also look for patterns in the types of lenders that invest in certain
areas.56 In addition to looking at whether mortgages were made and what types
of loans were made in red areas, then, a test of HOLC’s redlining impact should
also determine if the security maps led certain types of lenders to avoid red
areas while others serviced them disproportionately.
Four different characteristics of mortgages were analyzed: total number of
mortgages, interest rate, loan-to-value ratio, and type of lender.57 None of these
adequately captures the nature of residential mortgage lending in a given area
by itself, but together they offer a reasonably sufficient method of testing for
redlining. The total number of mortgages addresses the issue of categorical
redlining. This measure does not, however, reflect the varied demand for mort-
gages in an area, treating households that were denied a mortgage the same
way as those that had no interest in buying or selling. Some properties would
have inevitably been involved in more mortgage transactions by virtue of
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having been built before this period rather than during it. Analysis of the inter-
est rate and loan-to-value ratio avoids this problem by only considering prop-
erties that actually received mortgages. Using these two characteristics, it is
also possible to determine whether redlined areas received mortgages with less
favorable terms, even if mortgages were available. Finally, lender type is used
to determine if categorical redlining occurred among certain groups of lenders.
Linear regression, spatial lag models, and Bayesian spatial probit models
were used to analyze the relationship between HOLC grades and these differ-
ent mortgage characteristics while controlling for certain property characteris-
tics.58 In addition to the HOLC grade for the area in which a property was
located, its distance from a red area (“red line”) was analyzed.59 The number of
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Figure 2: Residential Security Map for Philadelphia with Sample Areas and Sample
Properties
transactions and number of sheriff sales between 1928 and 1937 per residential
structures on a block were used to control for lending patterns and risk levels
before HOLC made its maps.60 Ideally, the credit worthiness of the borrower
would be included as a control variable, but while lenders had access to some
form of credit history for borrowers at the time, that information is no longer avail-
able. Information about the characteristics of the property is available, includ-
ing the size, assessed value, and whether the owner occupied it. Together with
the year of the transaction, these were used as control variables (see Table 1).61
Results of the statistical analyses show that the relationship between HOLC
grade and the number of mortgages for a property varied by area, but the direc-
tion of the relationships was not consistent, and none of them was even margin-
ally significant. The results of the analyses of interest rates were the most
consistent in terms of the direction and significance of the relationships. For all
five samples, loans on properties with higher (worse) grades had higher inter-
est rates, while loans on properties farther from red areas had lower interest
rates (see Tables 2, 3, and 4). These relationships were statistically significant
for all except the Roxborough/Manayunk sample.
Analysis of the loan-to-value ratio generated very inconsistent, and mostly
nonsignificant, results. Analysis of the type of lender showed differences in
lender type across HOLC grades for each of the sample areas, but in almost
every case these differences are explained away by property and loan attrib-
utes, and there was no categorical redlining based on the HOLC grades by any
type of lender. The only statistically significant differences in lender type that
the property and loan characteristics do not account for were among federal
savings and loan associations in Roxborough/Manayunk and among mortgage
companies and nonfederal savings and loan associations in Frankford/
Kensington. In Roxborough/Manayunk, federal savings and loan associations
were less likely to make loans in or near red areas. In Frankford/Kensington,
mortgage companies were less likely to make loans in or near red areas, while
nonfederal savings and loans were more likely to make loans in or near red
areas.62
These results confirm that lenders did not categorically redline areas that
HOLC colored red. Households in all parts of the five sample areas succeeded
in securing mortgages. This analysis does not account for different levels of
demand for mortgages in those areas, and red areas may have had higher loan
rejection rates than those with more favorable assessments. It also does not
include contract sales, which may have been more common in red areas.63 But
the analysis does indicate that there was a significant amount of conventional
mortgage activity in all parts of the city involving many different types of lend-
ers. While these different types of lenders showed preferences for certain areas
and types of properties, none categorically refused to lend to all red areas.
While the differences in interest rates across grade was significant, the rates
only varied from 4 to 6 percent anywhere in the city.64 These differences might
be explained in several different ways. If FHA did use HOLC’s maps, they may
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have avoided insuring loans in red areas. FHA-insured properties had low
interest rates, so this could account for the higher interest rates in red areas.65
More likely, the higher interest rates probably reflected perceived risk levels,
particularly because of the presence of African Americans. Lenders could
have obtained information about racial composition and other neighborhood
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TABLE 1
Variables for Statistical Models of Mortgage Characteristics
Variable Type Data Source
Number of mortgages Dependent (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Loan-to-value ratio Dependent (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Interest rate Dependent (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Lender type Dependent (dummy) Philadelphia Realty Directory
HOLC grade Independent (continuous) HOLC Residential Security Map
Distance from red area Independent (continuous) HOLC Residential Security Map
Assessed value of house Control (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Year mortgage made Control (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Owner occupied Control (dummy) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Size of house Control (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Mortgages on face block,
1928-1937 Control (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
Foreclosures on face block,
1928-1937 Control (continuous) Philadelphia Realty Directory
TABLE 2
Spatial Lag Results for Small Area Samples (Interest Rate)
East Falls/ West Frankford/
Variable Germantown Philadelphia Kensington
Constant 5.070 5.836 5.876
(16.561) (24.601) (26.653)
HOLC grade 0.233*** 0.221*** 0.241***
(3.773) (5.588) (6.394)
Loan to value –0.096 –0.899*** –0.675***
(–0.427) (–4.999) (–3.748)
Assessed value –0.003 –0.004*** –0.0052
(–0.385) (–2.847) (–0.612)
Size –0.015* –0.016 0.0068
(–1.924) (0.470) (0.402)
Year –0.058*** –0.074*** –0.084***
(–4.431) (–6.075) (–8.857)
Pre-1938 transactions –0.147* –0.490*** –0.084
(–1.907) (–4.236) (–1.53)
Pre-1938 sheriff sales –0.289 1.252*** –0.244
(–1.305) (3.999) (–1.016)
Owner occupied –0.054 0.027 0.099
(–0.608) (0.439) (1.261)
NOTE: Pseudo R2 = .12 for East Falls/Germantown; .19 for West Philadelphia; and .37 for
Frankford/Kensington; z values in parentheses.
*p < .10. ***p < .01.
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TABLE 4
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results
for Random Citywide Sample (Interest Rate)
Variable HOLC Grade Distance to Red
Constant 5.134 6.392
(0.283) (0.229)
HOLC grade 0.375*** NA
(0.049) NA
Distance to red NA –0.091***
NA (0.013)
Loan to value –0.764*** –0.663***
(0.230) (–0.233)
Assessed value –0.022 –0.003
(0.026) (0.026)
Size 0.034 0.069
(0.044) (0.045)
Year –0.054*** –0.057***
(0.015) (0.015)
Pre-1938 transactions 0.031 0.011
(0.047) (0.048)
Owner occupied –0.084 –0.073
(0.095) (0.096)
NOTE: HOLC = Home Owners’Loan Corporation.Multiple R 2 = 0.31 for HOLC grade and 0.29 for
distance to red. Standard errors in parentheses. HOLC grade and distance to red were not in-
cluded in the same equation because of concern for extreme multicollinearity (correlation greater
than 0.8).
***p < .01.
TABLE 3
Spatial Lag Results for Small Areas Samples (Interest Rate)
East Falls/ West Frankford/
Variable Germantown Philadelphia Kensington
Constant 5.919 6.679 6.823
(25.469) (31.000) (37.455)
Distance to red –0.258*** –0.210*** –0.247***
(–3.620) (–5.674) (–6.219)
Loan to value –0.066 –0.933*** –0.713***
(–0.293) (–5.217) (–4.115)
Assessed value –0.0034 –0.003** –0.001
(–0.494) (–3.105) (–0.118)
Size –0.015** –0.046 –0.0026
(–2.014) (–1.737) (–0.157)
Year –0.061*** –0.073*** –0.086***
(–4.639) (–5.994) (–9.317)
Pre-1938 transactions –0.139* –0.403 –0.070
(–1.803) (–3.498) (–1.282)
Pre-1938 sheriff sales –0.244 1.234*** –0.304
(–1.098) (3.942) (–1.290)
Owner occupied –0.055 0.001 0.100
(–0.618) (0.018) (1.289)
NOTE: Pseudo R 2 = .12 for East Falls/Germantown; .19 for West Philadelphia; and .36 for
Frankford/Kensington; z values in parentheses.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
characteristics from a variety of sources, such as their own surveys or U.S.
Census and Real Property Survey data. They did not need secret maps to make
these judgments.
These statistical results relate only to the effect of HOLC grades on
mortgage-lending patterns in Philadelphia. The impact may have been differ-
ent in other cities, particularly those where HOLC conducted resurveys that
would have provided more up-to-date information for lenders. However, prior
research on HOLC has suggested that HOLC’s maps caused redlining in all the
surveyed cities. The results for Philadelphia call into question this blanket
conclusion.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that HOLC caused redlining. Redlining existed prior to the ini-
tiation of the City Survey Program, and areas colored red by HOLC were
already suffering from a lack of mortgage funds before the maps were made.
Lenders did not have widespread access to HOLC’s maps, but they did have
access to a wide array of other sources of information about housing and
demographic patterns in their communities. Areas HOLC assigned worse
grades and areas near red areas did not have fewer mortgages, and no group of
lenders categorically refused to make loans to red areas. HOLC grades do help
to explain differences in interest rates, but they do nothing to explain differ-
ences in loan-to-value ratios.
The fact that the maps were not widely distributed or discussed in the major
real estate and appraisal journals also undermines the conclusion that HOLC
institutionalized the practice of redlining. If FHA and private lenders had
adopted HOLC’s appraisal standards and procedures, rather than the actual
maps, the language with which they described their own maps would have
been more similar to HOLC’s. The fact that it was not indicates that most lend-
ers either were not aware of HOLC’s mapping efforts or viewed them as just
one of many examples of how to appraise neighborhoods.
HOLC was as much a follower as a leader when it came to neighborhood
appraisals. Leading real estate texts had started calling for assessments of
neighborhood conditions, particularly racial composition and housing quality,
before HOLC was even created. Congress mandated that FHA develop a sys-
tem of appraising mortgage risk levels, leading its research department to
establish and actively promote guidelines for choosing neighborhoods in
which to insure mortgages, before HOLC launched its City Survey Program.
Private lending institutions, many of which wanted to meet FHA’s standards so
that the loans they made could be insured, were also busy categorizing neigh-
borhoods and creating their own risk maps during the 1930s and 1940s.
To argue that HOLC was following the lead of FHA and private lenders is
not to insist that HOLC residential security maps were insignificant. As
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researchers who have studied HOLC have implied, these are invaluable pri-
mary sources; they have simply been misinterpreted. Rather than being the pri-
mary cause of redlining, these sources point to a more complicated story that
involves a much wider cast of characters and maps. Buzz Bissinger wrote that
in the Philadelphia residential security map “lay startling evidence of the seeds
of the city’s destruction.”66 This is probably true, but the map provides evi-
dence that ecological and infiltration theories, racial prejudice, and real estate
and appraisal industry codification of all these sentiments in combination with
federal endorsement and promotion of them—not the maps, themselves—
caused urban decline. The HOLC maps are probably the clearest, most acces-
sible, and most dramatic evidence of this collusion, but that does not make
them the most influential.
ORIGINS OF THE HOLC REDLINING THESIS
Researchers did not connect the red-shaded areas of HOLC’s residential
security maps to redlining by FHA and private lenders until the maps had
become historic artifacts, tucked away within FHLBB records at the National
Archives. The massive changes that cities experienced between the time the
maps were created and their rediscovery in the late 1970s influenced efforts to
make sense of them. Americans had seized on FHA- and VA-insured loans as a
way to leave the city and purchase single-family homes in the suburbs. Manu-
facturers had largely deserted cities as well, and federal highway spending had
further accelerated metropolitan dispersal. In the wake of widespread rioting
in the late 1960s, community groups had mounted campaigns against lenders
who refused to make loans to their urban neighborhoods. A series of federal
laws recognized redlining as a form of housing discrimination and took steps
to eliminate it. Since the 1970s, researchers have struggled to make sense of all
these developments. Long-hidden maps that predated the crises in the cities
capturing the federal government’s harsh appraisals of urban neighborhoods
across the country seemed to provide a clue.
Urban researchers across academic disciplines have since relied on one set
of maps to explain the loss of capital in central city neighborhoods and a single
chapter in Jackson’s ambitious and wide-ranging book to bridge an enormous
gap in redlining research. The proposition that HOLC’s maps explain urban
disinvestment from the Depression until the riots in the late 1960s is illogical,
yet this is the logical implication of many statements about HOLC’s role. In the
absence of fine-level data showing where FHA insured homes within cities
and detailed information about the underwriting practices of private lenders,
HOLC appeared to be the one caught with the smoking gun.67 The 150 boxes of
archival material relating to FHLBB’s City Survey Program contain little in
the way of an explanation, leaving room for researchers to assign meaning to
the elaborate maps and reports. Once found, it was easy to connect HOLC’s
bleeding maps to the conditions in America’s bleeding cities. Discovery of
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HOLC’s maps has brought needed attention to the role that access to credit
plays in the well-being of urban neighborhoods, but it has also diverted energy
from investigating the role of other maps and other agents of redlining.
ORIGINS OF REDLINING
Even before the Depression, private lenders chose to avoid certain areas,
particularly those home to African Americans, certain ethnic groups including
new immigrants, and with older, cheaper housing. There is no evidence that
they used red lines on maps to mark off these areas, but they were practicing
redlining. During the 1930s, real estate agents, appraisers, and lenders all
became obsessed with neighborhood risk ratings, in part because they blamed
poor real estate appraisal methods for their Depression losses and in part
because they adopted the long-term mortgage as the standard. With the short-
term mortgages common through the 1920s and early 1930s, lenders had little
concern for real estate trends in the neighborhoods they serviced. But the long-
term self-amortizing loans that HOLC (fifteen-year) and FHA (thirty-year)
instituted made lenders much more eager to consider the long-term prospect of
their investments. Toward that end, they shared information through textbooks
and the journals and conferences sponsored by the newly formed national real
estate and appraisal associations. FHA and FHLBB publications further facili-
tated this exchange.
FHLBB established its City Survey Program in the middle of all this activity
around risk rating, reflecting—rather than infecting—widespread neighbor-
hood appraisal practices and standards. FHA, on the other hand, was a leader in
establishing and promoting standards and procedures for neighborhood
appraisals. Whether or not it used maps with red lines, FHA did more to institu-
tionalize redlining than any other agency by categorizing mortgages according
to their risk level and encouraging private lenders who wanted insurance for
their mortgages to do the same. Having completed its lending by the time it fin-
ished its first set of maps, HOLC was not in as influential a position as FHA
was, with its widely distributed Underwriting Manual and long-term involve-
ment in residential mortgage lending. Since the publication of Crabgrass
Frontier, researchers have blamed HOLC for steering FHA away from central
city neighborhoods. But there is no evidence that FHA would have looked on
homes in the city any more favorably had it not been for HOLC’s maps. On the
contrary, FHA’s Underwriting Manual, numerous surveys, and own
mapmaking reflected an antiurban and racial bias deeper than HOLC’s. The
written materials that accompanied HOLC’s maps consistently stated that
loans could still be made profitably in areas considered high risk; FHA’s mate-
rials did not. So while Jackson and others have put too much emphasis on
HOLC’s role in redlining, all the evidence suggests that the federal govern-
ment did, in fact, have a very real impact on private lending. But it was the poli-
cies and practices of FHA that seem to have been the primary influence.
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The larger lesson, though, is that focusing on one agent of change, even if it
is a large federal agency, is to assign relatively passive roles to the thousands of
appraisers, realtors, and lenders who decided where to make loans. In assum-
ing that they all adopted one set of maps to guide their decisions, researchers
have underestimated the initiative and research skills of this large group. Alter-
natively, to view them as agents of change who shared some basic ideas about
real estate valuation but did not necessarily implement them the same way is to
invite the telling of a much richer and complicated redlining story than has
been presented before.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Much additional research is needed to piece together the many actors and
sources of neighborhood risk ratings into a coherent narrative of historical red-
lining. While further research of FHA archives could turn up additional infor-
mation, it is more likely that future searches through the records of municipal
agencies, lenders, and real estate organizations will turn up new evidence of
redlining, possibly in the form of maps and underwriting guidelines.68 Analy-
sis of mortgage records is also needed to determine the extent of redlining and
the level of consensus among lenders about where to make loans. Case histo-
ries of particular lending institutions and neighborhoods could also make con-
tributions. It is unlikely that searches through government archives will reveal
fine-level data describing the location of FHA-insured loans, but it may be pos-
sible to use local sources—including mortgage records, newspaper articles,
interviews, and lender records—to figure this out.
In addition, future research on redlining needs to make sense of the relation-
ships among the many mapmaking and risk-rating efforts. How were
FHLBB’s City Survey Program and the data collection and mapmaking taking
place at FHA related? Was there a relationship between the map that J. M.
Brewer created in Philadelphia in 1934 and the maps the Mortgage Conference
of New York were making throughout the 1930s? To what extent were these
smaller, local mapping efforts responses to industry-wide pressure as opposed
to the independent products of enterprising lenders?
Most important, future research on early redlining needs to demonstrate
how FHA and lenders used maps, or other sources of information about neigh-
borhoods, to make decisions. This does not require quantitative analysis,
although the tools of social science—including geographic information sys-
tems and spatial statistical analysis—can make important contributions. But
making a case for redlining does require empirical research. By themselves,
maps with red lines are not adequate proof of redlining. Future research needs
to make a direct connection between underwriting criteria and lending deci-
sions to show how redlining affected cities like Philadelphia.
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